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Abstract
We address a general representation prob-
lem for belief change, and describe two in-
terrelated representations for iterative non-
prioritized change: a logical representation
in terms of persistent epistemic states, and a
constructive representation in terms of flocks
of bases.
1 Introduction
Two main kinds of representation for belief change
have been suggested in the literature. In the AGM
theory [Alchourro´n et al., 1985, Ga¨rdenfors, 1988], be-
lief change is considered as a change of belief sets that
are taken to be deductively closed theories. According
to the so-called base approach, however, a belief set
should be seen as generated by some (finite) base (see,
e.g., [Hansson, 1999]). Consequently, revisions of be-
lief sets are determined on this approach by revisions
of their underlying bases. This drastically reduces the
set of alternatives and hence makes this approach con-
structive and computationally feasible.
The AGM theory and base approach constitute
two seemingly incomparable representations for be-
lief change, each with advantages of its own. Still,
the framework of epistemic states suggested in
[Bochman, 2001a, Bochman, 2001b] allows to formu-
late both as different species of a single general rep-
resentation. The reformulation makes it possible, in
particular, to reveal common constitutive principles
behind them. These common principles embody, how-
ever, also common shortcomings that lead to a loss of
information in iterated changes. This suggests epis-
temic states in their full generality as a justified rep-
resentational alternative.
Epistemic states could be primarily seen as a general-
ization of the AGM models, namely, they form an ab-
stract logical representation for belief change. Though
the base-oriented models can be translated into epis-
temic states, the translation loses some important ad-
vantages of such models, namely their inherent finite-
ness and constructivity. Hence it would be desirable to
have a constructive representation for epistemic states
that would preserve these features of base models while
avoiding their problems. Fortunately, such an alter-
native representation has already been suggested in
[Fagin et al., 1986], and it amounts to using sets, or
flocks, of bases. As we will show, a certain modifica-
tion of the original flock models will provide us with
a constructive representation for an important class of
epistemic states and belief change processes in them.
Remark. The theory described below, is different from
that suggested in [Bochman, 1999, Bochman, 2000],
since the latter has turned out to be flawed in its treat-
ment of expansions. The shortcoming has created the
need for shifting the level of representation from pure
epistemic states used in the above papers to more gen-
eral persistent epistemic states (see below).
2 Epistemic states
A common feature of the AGM and base representa-
tions is a preference structure on certain subsets of
the belief set. In the case of the AGM paradigm, it
is a preference structure on the maximal subtheories
of the belief set, while for the base representation it
is a preference structure on subtheories that are gen-
erated by the subsets of the base. The notion of an
epistemic state, defined below, reflects and generalizes
this common structure of the two representations.
Definition 2.1. An epistemic state E is a triple
(S, l,≺), where S is a set of admissible belief states,
≺ is a preference relation on S, while l is a labelling
function assigning a deductively closed theory (called
an admissible belief set) to every admissible belief state
from S.
Any epistemic state determines a unique set of propo-
sitions that are believed in it, namely, the set a propo-
sitions that hold in all maximally preferred admissible
belief states. Thus, even if an epistemic state contains
conflicting preferred belief states, we can still believe
in propositions that hold in all of them. Still, the belief
set associated with an epistemic state does not always
constitute an admissible belief set by itself. The latter
will hold, however, in an ideal situation when an epis-
temic state contains a unique most preferred admissi-
ble belief state. Such epistemic states will be called
determinate. Both AGM and base models correspond
to determinate epistemic states. Nevertheless, non-
determinate epistemic states have turned to be essen-
tial for an adequate representation of both nonmono-
tonic reasoning and belief change. In particular, the
necessity of accepting non-determination arises most
clearly in the analysis of contractions (see below).
In what follows, we will concentrate on a special kind
of persistent epistemic states that will provide a rep-
resentation for a non-prioritized belief change.
Definition 2.2. An epistemic state will be called per-
sistent if it satisfies
Persistence If s ≺ t, then l(s) ⊆ l(t).
For persistent epistemic states, the informational con-
tent of admissible belief states is always preserved
(persist) in transitions to more preferred states. This
property reflects the idea that the informational con-
tent of an admissible state is an essential (though pre-
sumably not the only) factor in determining the place
of this state in the preference structure.
Persistent epistemic states are formally similar to a
number of information models suggested in the log-
ical literature, such as Kripke’s semantics for intu-
itionistic logic, Veltman’s data semantics, etc. (see
[Benthem, 1988] for an overview). All such mod-
els consist of a partially ordered set of informational
states. The relevant partial order represents possible
ways of information growth, so it is assumed to satisfy
the persistence requirement by its very meaning.
As will be shown, persistent epistemic states consti-
tute a smallest natural class of epistemic states that is
closed under belief change operations that do not in-
volve prioritization. Moreover, it is precisely this class
of epistemic states that admits a constructive repre-
sentation in terms of flocks of bases.
An epistemic state will be called pure if it satisfies
Pure Monotonicity s  t if and only if l(s) ⊆ l(t).
Pure epistemic states is a special kind of persistent
states for which the preference relation is determined
solely by the informational content of admissible be-
lief states. Accordingly, a pure epistemic state can be
defined simply as a set of deductively closed theories,
with the intended understanding that the relation of
set inclusion among such theories plays the role of a
preference relation. In other words, for pure epistemic
states, preference is given to maximal theories.
Pure epistemic states have been used in
[Bochman, 1999, Bochman, 2000] as a basis for a
foundational approach to belief change. As we
mentioned, however, the approach has turned out
to be flawed, since it does not provide an adequate
representation of belief expansions. The present study
stems from a more general approach to representing
belief change suggested in [Bochman, 2001b].
3 Bases and flocks
Assume that a belief set B is generated by some base
∆ with respect to a certain consequence relation Th
(that is, B = Th(∆)). This structure is representable
as an epistemic state of the form (P (∆), l,≺), where
admissible belief states are the subsets of ∆, l assigns
each such subset its deductive closure, while ≺ is a
preference relation on P (∆). In the simplest (non-
prioritized) case, this preference relations is definable
via set inclusion: Γ ≺ Φ iff Γ ⊂ Φ.
In the latter case base-generated epistemic states are
equivalent to pure epistemic states consisting of theo-
ries of the form Th(Γ), where Γ ranges over the subsets
of ∆. Notice that any such epistemic state will be de-
terminate, since it contains a most preferred theory,
namely Th(∆).
Unfortunately, we will see later that base-generated
epistemic states (and bases themselves) are arguably
inadequate for representing belief contractions. A gen-
eralization of bases that overcomes this shortcoming
has been suggested in [Fagin et al., 1986] and consists
in using sets (or ‘flocks’) of bases.
By a flock we will mean an arbitrary set of sets of
propositions F = {∆i}, for i ∈ I. Such a flock can
be considered as a collection of bases ∆i, and the fol-
lowing construction of the epistemic state generated
by a flock can be seen as a natural generalization of
base-generated epistemic states.
Any flock generates an epistemic state EF = 〈F↓, l,≺〉
defined as follows:
• F↓ is a set of all nonempty sets Γ such that Γ ⊆ ∆,
for some ∆ ∈ F ;
• l(Γ) = Th(Γ), for each Γ ∈ F↓;
• Γ ≺ Φ holds iff Γ ⊂ Φ.
As can be seen, flocks constitute a generalization of
bases. Namely, any base ∆ can be identified with a
singular flock {∆}.
As in our study, flocks were used in [Fagin et al., 1986]
as a framework for belief change operations. Our sub-
sequent results will be different, however. The main
difference can be described as follows.
Let us say that two flocks are identical if they generate
the same epistemic state. Now, let F be a flock and ∆0
a set of propositions such that ∆0 ⊆ ∆, for some ∆ ∈
F . Then it is easy to see that flocks F and F ∪ {∆0}
produce the same epistemic state, and consequently
they are identical in the above sense. This shows
that a flock is determined, in effect, by its inclusion-
maximal elements. According to [Fagin et al., 1986],
however, the above two flocks are distinct, and hence
the validity of propositions with respect to a flock is de-
termined, in effect, by minimal sets belonging to the
flock. This makes the resulting theory less plausible
and more complex than it could be.
The above feature, though plausible by itself, gives
rise, however, to high sensitivity of flocks with respect
to the syntactic form of the propositions occurring in
them.
Example 3.1. Let us consider the flock F =
{{A′}, {A,B}}, where A′ is logically equivalent to
A. Replacing A′ with A, we obtain a different flock
F ′ = {{A}, {A,B}}, which is identical to {{A,B}}.
Note that A∧B is believed in the epistemic state gen-
erated by the latter flock, though only A is believed in
the epistemic state generated by the source flock F .
The above example shows that flocks do not admit re-
placements of logically equivalent propositions, at least
in cases when such a replacement leads to identifica-
tion of propositions with other propositions appearing
elsewhere in the flock. It should be kept in mind, how-
ever, that the epistemic state generated by a flock is
a syntax-independent object, though purely syntactic
differences in flocks may lead to significant differences
in epistemic states generated by them.
Flock-generated epistemic states are always persistent;
this follows immediately from the fact that Γ ≺ Φ
holds in such a state if and only if Γ ⊂ Φ, and
hence Th(Γ) ⊆ Th(Φ). Moreover, it has been shown
in [Bochman, 2001b] that any finitary persistent epis-
temic state is representable by some flock. This means
that flocks constitute an adequate syntactic formalism
for representing persistent epistemic states. Unfortu-
nately, this also shows that flocks are not representable
by pure epistemic states, as has been suggested in
[Bochman, 1999].
4 Changing epistemic states
Since belief sets are uniquely determined by epistemic
states, operations on epistemic states will also deter-
mine corresponding operations on belief sets. Two
kinds of operations immediately suggest themselves as
most fundamental, namely removal and addition of in-
formation to epistemic states.
4.1 Contractions
Admissible belief states of an epistemic state consti-
tute all potential alternatives that are considered as
‘serious possibilities’ by the agent. In accordance with
this, the contraction of a proposition A from an epis-
temic state E is defined as an operation that removes
all admissible belief states from E that support A. We
will denote the resulting epistemic state by E−A.
The contraction operation has quite regular proper-
ties, most important of which being commutativity: a
sequence of contractions can be performed in any order
yielding the same resulting epistemic state.
Let us compare the above contraction with base con-
traction. According to [Hansson, 1993], the first step
in performing a base contraction of A consists in find-
ing preferred (selected) subsets of the base that do
not imply A. So far, this fits well with our construc-
tion, since the latter subsets exactly correspond to pre-
ferred admissible theories of the contracted epistemic
state. Then our definition says, in effect, that the con-
tracted belief set should be equal to the intersection
of these preferred theories. Unfortunately, such a so-
lution is unacceptable for the base paradigm, since we
need to obtain a unique contracted base; only the lat-
ter will determine the resulting belief set. Accordingly,
[Hansson, 1993] defines first the contracted base as the
intersection of all preferred subsets of the base (‘par-
tial meet base contraction’), and then the contracted
belief set is defined as the set of all propositions that
are implied by the new base.
The problems arising in this approach are best il-
lustrated by the following example (adapted from
[Hansson, 1992]).
Example 4.1. Two equally good and reliable friends
of a student say to her, respectively, that Niamey is
a Nigerian town, and that Niamey has a university.
Our student should subsequently retract her acquired
belief that Niamey is a university town in Nigeria.
Let A and B denote, respectively, propositions “Ni-
amey is a town in Nigeria”, and “There is a univer-
sity in Niamey”. Then the above situation can be de-
scribed as a contraction of A ∧ B from the (belief set
generated by the) base {A,B}. As has been noted in
[Ga¨rdenfors and Rott, 1995], this small example con-
stitutes a mayor stumbling block for the base approach
to belief change. Actually, we will see that none of the
current approaches handles satisfactorily this example.
To begin with, it seems reasonable to expect that the
contracted belief set in the above situation should con-
tain A ∨ B, since each of the acceptable alternatives
support this belief. This result is also naturally sanc-
tioned by the AGM theory. Using the base contrac-
tion, however, we should retreat first to the two sub-
bases {A} and {B} that do not imply A∧B, and then
form their intersection which happens to be empty!
In other words, we have lost all the information con-
tained in the initial base, so all subsequent changes
should start from a scratch.
Next, it seems also reasonable to require that if sub-
sequent evidence rules out A, for example, we should
believe that B. In other words, contracting first A∧B
and then A from the initial belief state should make us
believe in B. This time the AGM theory cannot pro-
duce this result. The reason is that the first contrac-
tion gives the logical closure of A∨B as the contracted
belief set, and hence the subsequent contraction of A
will not have any effect on the corresponding belief
state. Notice that this information loss is not ‘seen’
in one-step changes; it is revealed, however, in subse-
quent changes.
As we see it, the source of the above problem is that
traditional approaches to belief change force us to
choose in situations we have no grounds for choice.
And our suggested solution here amounts to retain-
ing all the preferred alternatives as parts of the new
epistemic state, instead of transforming them into a
single ‘combined’ solution. This means, in particu-
lar, that we should allow our epistemic states to be
non-determinate. This will not prevent us from deter-
mining each time a unique current set of beliefs; but
we should remember more than that.
Returning to the example, our contraction operation
results in a new belief set Th(A ∨ B), as well as a
new epistemic state {Th(A),Th(B)} consisting of two
theories. This latter epistemic state, however, is not
base-generated, though it will be generated by a flock
{{A}, {B}}.
4.1.1 Contraction of flocks
Flocks emerge as a nearest counterpart of bases that
will already be closed with respect to our contrac-
tion operation. Actually, the latter will correspond
to the operation of deletion on flocks suggested in
[Fagin et al., 1986].
Definition 4.1. A contraction of a flock F = {∆i}
with respect to A (notation F−A) is a flock consisting
of all maximal subsets of each ∆i that do not imply
A.
The following result confirms that the above opera-
tion on flocks corresponds to contraction of associated
epistemic states.
Lemma 4.1. If EF is an epistemic state generated by
a flock F , then, for any A, EF −A = E(F−A).
Despite the similarity of the above definition of con-
traction with that given in [Fagin et al., 1986], the re-
sulting contraction operation will behave differently in
our framework. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4.2. Contraction of the flock F =
{{A}, {B}} with respect to A is a flock {∅, {B}},
which is identical to {{B}} according to our definition
of identity. Consequently, B will be believed in the
resulting epistemic state. This behavior seems also
to agree with our intuitions, since eliminating A as
an option will leave us with B as a single solution.
In the representation of [Fagin et al., 1986], however,
{∅, {B}} is reducible to {∅}. Consequently, nothing
will be believed in the resulting epistemic state. Fur-
thermore, this also makes the corresponding operation
of deletion non-commutative: whereas deletion of
A ∧ B and then A from the base {A,B} results in
{∅, {B}}, deletion of A first and then A ∧ B will give
a different flock, namely {{B}}.
4.2 Merge and expansion
The operation of expansion consists in adding infor-
mation to epistemic states. In the AGM theory, this
is achieved through a straightforward addition of the
new proposition to the belief set, while in the base ap-
proach the new proposition is added directly to the
base.
The framework of epistemic states drastically changes,
however, the form and content of expansion opera-
tions. This stems already from the fact that adding
a proposition to an epistemic state is no longer re-
ducible to adding it to the belief set; it should deter-
mine also the place of the newly added proposition in
the structure of the expanded epistemic state. This
will establish the degree of firmness with which we
should believe the new proposition, as well as its de-
pendence and justification relations with other beliefs.
As a way of modelling this additional information, we
suggest to treat the latter as a special case of merg-
ing the source epistemic state with another epistemic
state that will represent the added information. Ac-
cordingly, we will describe first some merge operation
on epistemic states. Then an expansion will be defined
roughly as a merge of E with a rudimentary epistemic
state that is generated by the base {A}.
4.2.1 Merging epistemic states
Merge is a procedure of combining a number of epis-
temic states into a single epistemic state, in which we
seek to combine information that is supported by the
source epistemic states. It turns out that this notion
of merging can be captured using a well-known alge-
braic construction of product. Roughly, a merge of
two epistemic states E1 and E2 is an epistemic state in
which the admissible states are all pairs of admissible
states from E1 and E2, the labelling function assigns
each such pair the deductive closure of the union of
their corresponding labels, while the resulting prefer-
ence relation agrees with the ‘component’ preferences
(see [Bochman, 2001b] for a formal description).
Since the primary subject of this study is non-
prioritized change, we will consider below only one
kind of merge operations, namely a pure merge that
treats the source epistemic states as having an equal
‘weight’.
Definition 4.2. A pure merge of epistemic states
E1 = (S1, l1,≺1) and E2 = (S2, l2,≺2) is an epistemic
state E1 × E2 = (S1 × S2, l,≺) such that
• l(s1, s2) = Th(l1(s1) ∪ l2(s2)), for any (s1, s2) ∈
S1 × S2;
• (s1, s2)  (t1, t2) iff s1 1 t1 and s2 2 t2.
A pure merge is a merge operation that treats the
two component epistemic states as two equally reli-
able sources. It is easy to see, in particular, that it is
a commutative operation.
Being applied to base-generated epistemic states, pure
merge corresponds to a straightforward union of two
bases:
Lemma 4.2. If E1 and E2 are epistemic states gener-
ated, respectively, by bases ∆1 and ∆2, then E1×E2 is
equivalent to an epistemic state generated by ∆1 ∪∆2.
4.2.2 Merging flocks
To begin with, the following result shows that pure
merge preserves persistence of epistemic states.
Lemma 4.3. A pure merge of two persistent epis-
temic states is also a persistent epistemic state.
Since finitary persistent epistemic states are repre-
sentable by flocks, a pure merge gives rise to a certain
operation on flocks. This operation can be described
as follows:
Let us consider two flocks F1 and F2 that have no
propositions in common. Then a merge of F1 and F2
will be a flock
F1 ×F2 = {∆i ∪∆j | ∆i ∈ F1,∆j ∈ F2}
Thus, the merge of two disjoint flocks is obtained by a
pairwise combination of bases belonging to each flock.
Note, however, that the assumption of disjointness
turns out to be essential for establishing the corre-
spondence between merge of flocks and pure merge of
associated epistemic states. Still, this requirement is a
purely syntactic constraint that can be easily met by
replacing some of the propositions with logically equiv-
alent, though syntactically different propositions. A
suitable example will be given later when we will con-
sider expansions of flocks that are based on the above
notion of merge.
The following result shows that merge of flocks corre-
sponds exactly to a pure merge of associated epistemic
states.
Theorem 4.4. If EF and EG are epistemic states
generated, respectively, by disjoint flocks F and G, then
EF × EG is isomorphic to EF×G.
4.2.3 Pure expansions
For any proposition A, we will denote by EA the
epistemic state generated by a singular base {A}.
This pure epistemic state consists of just two theo-
ries, namely Th(∅) and Th(A). Accordingly, it gives a
most ‘pure’ expression of the belief in A. Now the idea
behind the definition below is that an expansion of an
epistemic state with respect to A amounts to merging
it with EA.
Definition 4.3. A pure expansion of an epistemic
state E with respect to a proposition A (notation
E + A) is a pure merge of E and the epistemic state
EA that is generated by a base {A}.
In a pure expansion the new proposition is added as an
independent piece of information, that is, as a proposi-
tion that is not related to others with respect to prior-
ity. Being applied to base-generated epistemic states,
pure expansion corresponds to a straightforward addi-
tion of a new proposition to the base.
Corollary 4.5. If E is generated by a base ∆, then
E+A is isomorphic to an epistemic state generated by
∆ ∪ {A}.
Since pure merge is a commutative operation, pure
expansions will also be commutative.
As any other kind of change in epistemic states, expan-
sions generate corresponding changes in belief sets of
epistemic states. It turns out that expansions generate
in this sense precisely AGM belief expansion functions:
Lemma 4.6. If B is a belief set of E, then the belief
set of E+A coincides with Th(B, A).
Thus, belief expansions generated by expansions of
epistemic states behave just as AGM expansions: the
underlying epistemic state plays no role in determin-
ing the resulting expanded belief set, since the latter
can be obtained by a direct addition of new propo-
sitions to the source belief set. It should be kept in
mind, however, that identical expansions of belief sets
can be produced by expansions of different epistemic
states, and even by different expansions of the same
epistemic state. These differences will be revealed in
subsequent contractions and revisions of the expanded
belief set.
4.2.4 Expansions of flocks
As we have seen earlier, pure merge generates a cor-
responding merge operation on flocks. Consequently,
pure expansion corresponds in this sense to a certain
expansion operation on flocks.
Definition 4.4. An expansion of a flock F = {∆i |
i ∈ I} with respect to a proposition A that does not
appear in F is a flock F +A = {∆i ∪ {A} | i ∈ I}.
Thus, an expansion of a flock is obtained simply by
adding the new proposition to each base from the flock.
Our earlier results immediately imply that this oper-
ation exactly corresponds to a pure expansion of the
associated epistemic state with A:
Corollary 4.7. If EF is an epistemic state generated
by the flock F , and A does not appear in F , then EF+
A is isomorphic to EF+A.
The above operation is quite similar in spirit
to the operation of insertion into flocks used in
[Fagin et al., 1986], though the latter was intended to
preserve consistency of the component bases, so they
defined, in effect, the corresponding revision opera-
tion based on contraction and expansion in our sense.
Note, however, that our flock expansion is defined only
when the added proposition does not appear in the
flock. The need for the restriction is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 4.3. Let us return to the flock F =
{{A}, {B}}, where A and B denote, respectively,
propositions “Niamey is a town in Nigeria”, and
“There is a university in Niamey”. Recall that this
flock is obtainable by contracting A∧B from the base
{A,B}. In other words, it reflects an informational
situation in which we have reasons to believe in each
of these propositions, but cannot believe in both.
Now let us expand the epistemic state EF with B.
This expansion can be modeled by expanding F with
some proposition B′ that is logically equivalent to B.
In other words, the epistemic state generated by the
flock F + B′ = {{B′, A}, {B′, B}} will be equivalent
to the expansion of EF with B. This flock sanctions
belief in B in full accordance with our intuitions. Ac-
tually, it can be shown that the latter flock is reducible
to a flock {{B′, A}, {B}} in the sense that the latter
flock will produce an equivalent epistemic state. How-
ever, B′ cannot be replaced with B in these flocks:
the flock {{B}, {B,A}} is already reducible to a sin-
gle base {{A,B}} in which both A and B are believed,
contrary to our intuitions about the relevant situation:
receiving a new support for believing that there is a
university in Niamey should not force us to believe
also that Niamey is a town in Nigeria. This also shows
most vividly that a straightforward addition of B to
each base in the flock {{A}, {B}} does not produce
intuitively satisfactory results1.
An additional interesting aspect of the above represen-
tation is that, though we fully believe in B in the flock
{{B}, {B′, A}}, the option A has not been forgotten;
if we will contract now B from the latter flock, we will
obtain the flock {{A}} which supports belief in A. A
little reflection shows that this is exactly what would
be reasonable to believe in this situation.
5 Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to give a formal rep-
resentation for iterative non-prioritized change. As
has been shown, such a representation can be achieved
in the framework of persistent epistemic states, with
flocks providing the corresponding constructive repre-
sentation. Moreover, these representations overcome
1Exactly this was a by-product of the representation
suggested in [Bochman, 1999].
shortcomings of both the AGM and base-oriented
models that incur loss of information in iterative
changes.
Contraction and expansions are two basic operations
on epistemic states that allow to define the majority
of derived belief changes. Thus, a revision of an epis-
temic state is definable via Levi identity (on the level of
epistemic states), namely as a combination of contrac-
tion and expansion. As can be shown, the resulting
operation will be sufficiently expressive to capture any
relational belief revision function in the sense of AGM.
To conclude the paper, we want to mention an in-
teresting problem concerning expressivity of our belief
change operations vis-a-vis flocks. Namely, it has been
shown in [Bochman, 2001b] that there are flocks that
are not constructible from simple primitive flocks us-
ing the contraction and expansion operations (a sim-
plest example being the flock {{p}, {p ∧ q}}). This
apparently suggests that our stock of belief change
operations is not complete and need to be extended
with other operations that would provide functional
completeness with respect to constructibility of flocks.
The resulting theory would give then a truly com-
plete constructive representation of non-prioritized be-
lief change.
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